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FIRST CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:
A RETURN TO HANNA ANALYSIS
I INTRODUCTION

The First Circuit, after being overruled in Hanna v. Plumer,' has struggled
over the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) where federal
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. In Cameron v. Otto Bock
Orthopedic Industry, Inc., 2 the First Circuit returned to a traditional Hanna
analysis, affirming the FRE as "procedural," presumptively mandating their
application in cases of diversity jurisdiction. While the First Circuit has
previously applied the FRE in diversity, the results are spurious because of the
avoidance of the application of Hanna analysis. The purpose of this paper,
therefore, is to analyze the First Circuit decisions up to Cameron which highly
suggest the First Circuit's previous improper interpretation and non-application
of Hanna.
First, federalism and the Supreme Court's conflict-of-law and conflict-ofFederal-Rule decisions will be analyzed, briefly describing both traditional Erie
analysis and Federal Rule analysis under Hanna. Second, the First Circuit
decisions will be surveyed for their basis in applying the FRE in diversity
actions. Third, the surveyed decisions will be analyzed to demonstrate the
potential improper application of Erie analysis to a Federal Rule conflict
problem under Hanna. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn based upon the First
Circuit decisions
II. HISTORY

A. Federalism,Framingthe Basic Problem
Federalism juxtaposes federal and state governmental power.4 For the
purposes of this discussion, federalism problems in the United States Courts
arise from the Constitution and Judiciary Act of 1789 which allows the Supreme
I Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1964).
2

Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Industry, Inc., 43 F.3d 14 (1994).

3 The author recognizes that there are related issues as to the effects of uniformly apply-

ing the Federal Rules of Evidence and does not attempt to analyze any such effects nor advocate
such application.
4 Federalism is defined as a system of government under which "there exists simultaneously a federal or central government and several state governments." KERMIT L.
HALL, FEDERALISM: A NATION OF STATES, Garland Publishing: New York. p. ix, (c) 1987
(providing articles discussing myriad aspects of federalism beyond scope of this article).
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Court to hear cases where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship
of litigating parties.5 The federalist justification for diversity jurisdiction is
based upon the protection of interstate citizens against possible prejudice being
imposed by a forum state court.6 The necessity for diversity jurisdiction,
however, is questionable due to the expansion of federal jurisdiction and
significant changes in the political environment between the federal government
and the states.7 While the reasons for the repeal of diversity are strong, diversity
jurisdiction remains relatively unchanged in its current form.'

5 See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1. (giving power to federal courts to adjudicate

state matters where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship of parties to
litigation); The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (recodified by 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1995)
(providing for Supreme Court and lower federal courts to apply power granted in Article
II, § 2, cl. I).
6 Dolores Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens
of Federalism, 78

VA. L. REv. 1671, 1672 (1992); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 99-105
(1969) [hereinafter ALl REPORT]. This report summarizes the three most common federal-

ist reasons for the promotion of general diversity jurisdiction: (1) to combat prejudice
against citizens of a foreign state (2) to encourage free trade between the states and combat those jealousies which may play out in a non-federal forum and (3) to make visible and
expand the role of the newly formed federal judiciary. Id. at 101.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1995) (granting the federal courts federal question jurisdiction). See Sloviter, supra note 6, at 1673 (citing Federal Courts Committee and Chief
Justice Rhenquist's and other legal commentators general denouncement of diversity jurisdiction based upon lack of validity of traditional arguments); ALl REPORT, supra note 6.
ALl commentators suggest that the incidental nationalizing of the federal government, the
imposition on free trade or prejudice arguments are not applicable to conditions as they
exist today. Id. at 105.; REPORT OF FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, April 2, 1990, at
38 (supporting repeal of federal diversity jurisdiction). See also HALL, supra note 4.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1332 (1995) (granting federal courts the power to hear cases
where subject matter jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship of the parties);
Clark, The Role of National Courts In 200 Years of Evolving Governance, 18 CUMB. L.
REv. 95 (1988). Chief Judge Clark of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasons:
Not even a consummate federalist can reasonably argue that the paramount
purpose of the Constitution . . . is advanced by reflexively aggregating
power in the central government or its courts. It is time that ideals exert
more influence over events. Nothing less than a deliberate effort to restore
state power and prestige will suffice.
Id. at 109.
Clark contends that federalist ideals are not being served properly under the current
expansionism of the federal government. Id. at 104. Similarly, political and economic
climate prevent the problems anticipated by federalists of the past. Id. Political conservatism and Bar opposition, however, make the prospect of the repeal of diversity jurisdiction unlikely. Id. at 105.
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Historically, diversity jurisdiction benefited foreign state parties involved in
interstate litigation. 9 Granting jurisdiction based solely on diversity of
citizenship, however, may encourage usurpation of state power by allowing
federal courts to intrude into state affairs. In 1848, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue in Swift v. Tyson.' ° In Swift, the Court held that
federal courts were to apply state law only when not contrary to the federal
court's interpretation of what the state law ought to be.1 The Swift holding
offered no protection to the state because it gave the federal courts broad
discretion to apply federal law. From a federalism perspective, the usurpation of
state power was unacceptable.
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court overruled Swift in Erie Rail
Road Co. v. Tompkins.' 2 Under the Erie Court's analysis, substantive state
laws are to be applied over federal laws in diversity actions.' 3 The United States
Supreme Court held that in order to prevent forum shopping and to promote the
uniform application of law, substantive state laws were applicable in conflict
situations between state and federal law. 4 The Erie court, however, did not
adequately define "substantive law."
The United States Supreme Court proposed its first "substantive" test in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 5 The Court held if application of federal law
would change the outcome of the case, the state law should govern. This test
was not satisfactory, however, because any difference is in some way "outcome
deterninative.' 16 Thus, the Supreme Court, in Hanna v. Plumer,held that the
"outcome determination" test was to be read in conjunction with the Erie
See generally Douglas D. McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Local Prejudice
Feared?, LIIGATION, Fall 1980 p. 38 (explaining while historically valid, the issue of
whether the prejudice argument is still valid remains uncertain); see supra notes 6-8.
10 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). But see Gregory Gelfand and Howard B.
9

Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITr. L. REv. 937,951. Gelfand and
Abrams reason that the Swift Court was not concerned with the expansion of federal encroachment upon state autonomy because the law was not developed. It was not until after
the Civil War, the Great Depression and the emergence of the New Deal Court that federal
encroachment upon state authority to promulgate its own policy became an issue. Id. Erie
presented itself at the height of the New Deal in 1938 and the federalist ideals came to the
forefront, offering protection to what state autonomy still remained. Id.
"1 Swift, 41 U.S. 1.
12 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 Id. at 73.
14

Id. The Erie court analyzed Pennsylvania negligence law as "substantive" law.

Id.
15 Guaranty

16

Id.

Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99(1945).
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doctrine goals of uniform administration of the law and the prevention of forum
shopping. 7 Applying the fundamental principles of Erie to the "outcome
determination" test in York would give the test context."8 Only those outcome
changes that would prevent the uniform application of the law or promote forum
shopping would be "substantive."' 9
The Hanna Court, however, also dealt with the specific issue of federalism
with regard to the applicability of a Federal Rule to a diversity action. Under
Hanna, there is no Erie problem when attempting to apply a Federal Rule.2 °
Instead, the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution supply the definition of
"substantive" and "procedural." It is the similar parlance and application of the
two doctrines that causes application problems.
B. The Supreme Court's Conflict Resolution Models
Legal commentators, practitioners, and judges have displayed
dissatisfaction with the use of formalistic "substantive" and "procedural"
distinctions in determining what choice of law or rule to apply in diversity
actions. 2' Notwithstanding general disfavor of such principles, the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Hanna established two fundamentally different
judicial conflict resolution models. The differing substance/procedure contexts

17 Hanna,

380 U.S. at 468 (holding outcome determination test must be applied to
twin goals of "discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of laws").
18 Id.
19 Id.
20

Id. at 469-470. The court held:

There is, however, a more fundamental flaw in respondent's syllogism:
the incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins constitutes
the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule. The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-470. Erie analysis is therefore expressly an incorrect test to apply
to a FRE conflict.
21 See Gelfand and Abrams, supra note 10, at 963 (questioning whether Court has
ever considered wisdom of a distinction between substance and procedure). See also
EHRENZWEIG, EHRENZWEIG ON CoNFLicrs OF LAW, 1962, § 114 (determining that the dichotomy between substance and procedure is "analytically meaningless"); Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,344 (1933)
(determining that arbitrary point of distinction changes with legal context reaching seemingly incongruous results); CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAw OF EVIDENCE, 1911, § 171
(expressing that no real distinction exists and any distinction between substantive and
procedural in any context is "artificial and illusory").
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will be referred to as: (1) the conflict-of-laws model (Erie analysis) and (2) the
conflict-of-Federal-Rules model (Hannaanalysis). 2
The Erie model is based upon the basic doctrine expressed in Erie and its
progeny that when a federal statute or practice infringes upon a state law, the
court should apply the law of the state. The meaning of "substance" under this
test refers to legal concepts or constructs that are enacted into law and
effectuated by the state. 23 "Procedure," in the Erie context, refers to traditional
notions of remedy and matters which promote the proper execution of the corpus
of the law.24 The goal of the Erie model is to promote the equitable
administration of justice and to discourage forum shopping. 25
In those limited circumstances where conflicts do occur based upon a FRE,
the Hanna Court provides an Erie-exclusive analysis.26 Under Hanna, the Rule

22

See John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87

HARVARD

L. REV. 693 (1962)

(construing the application of FRE not as an Erie question, but governed by the REA and
Constitution). Contra Gelfand and Abrams, supra, note 10, at 966. These authors contend
that the Federal Rules of Evidence are not Erie exempt because the Hanna decision is
inapposite with Erie. The Hanna Court modified its test under Erie, carving out an exception to Erie. If not, it would be applying Erie doctrine with its limitations to a problem
that is limited instead only by the Rules Enabling Act. Gelfand and Abrams assume that
the FRE should be applied under some form of Erie test. Id. at 981. Gelfand and Abrams
expose the very problems with applying the Erie test to Federal Rules in not being able to
resolve Rule-type conflicts. See id. at 1004 (conceding that Erie does not constitutionally
prohibit resulting deference to Federal Rules). For a discussion on which the Hanna
Court based their discussion of substance/procedure differentiation, see generally COOK,
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, at 150 (1943) (reasoning that substance
and procedure have differing meanings in differing contexts).
23 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. The example the Hanna court used were legal constructs in Erie such as the Pennsylvania Negligence law which denied recovery for longitudinal railway trespassers. Id.; see Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450
(describing procedural laws as prescribing manner in which rights may be exercised and
enforced).
24

See

GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1927) § 77 (determining distinction between

"remedial" or "procedural rights" and "primary and secondary" rights of action which are
"substantive" in this context); see also Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450
(describing procedural laws as prescribing manner in which rights may be exercised and
enforced).
25 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In cases of diversity jurisdiction, where a federal statute is in conflict with a State statute, where the application of the
federal would result in a different outcome to the litigation, the statute is deemed
"substantive" and the federal statute should yield to the state. Id. at 109. The York
Court's "outcome-determinative" test, however, was only meant to be applied to substantive state statutes and not to the application of a Federal Rule. Hanna,360 U.S. at 467.
26 Conflicts between the FRE and state rules of evidence should occur infrequently
where most of the states have codified their rules of evidence based upon the FRE. See
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applicability is limited by the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act (REA)
providing a broader analysis than under Erie.27 Congress, under the auspices of
the REA and the Constitution can pass "procedural" rules that are presumably
constitutionally valid on their face as rules of court, and simultaneously
substantive in affecting a state right under Erie.2 ' Nonetheless, the Federal Rule
would still trump the state construct because of the broad grant of power under

the Constitution and the REA, without consideration of Erie.29

Margaret E. Berger, The FederalRules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the goals of
Codification, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 255,256 nn. 7-9 (1984) (surveying 31 states, Puerto
Rico, and the military that have codified their evidentiary statutes as of 1980). It is significant to note that Massachusetts, while having proposed a codification of the evidentiary rules based upon the Federal Rules, propagates most of the litigation in this area,
including Hanna v. Plumer in which the Supreme Court overturned the First Circuit Appellate Court. See Berger at 267, (holding that Rule-making may obviate the need for the
Erie analysis). But see Gelfand and Abrams, supra, note 10, (maintaining that Federal
Rule conflicts are merely a species of Erie problem and should be attacked under the auspices of Erie).
27 The Rules Enabling Act (REA) allows the Judiciary to adopt rules of practice and
procedure to be applied in Federal District Courts and Courts of Appeal within the United
States and its Territories. These promulgated rules, however, can only apply to procedural
law and cannot compromise or broaden any substantive State law. Similarly, any state
laws, procedural in nature, in conflict with Federal Rules enacted under this provision are
trumped by the applicable Federal Rule and have no further effect within the federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (a),(b) (1994). See Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making
Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MicH.L.REv. 1116 (1934)
(explaining Rules Enabling Act in detail); HART & WEsCHLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, TriRD EDITION, at 759-762 (1988) (providing an overview of the
Rule Enabling Act and its application with regard to Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of
Evidence). See Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling
Act, 2 DuKE L.J. 281 (1989) (discussing substance and procedure variations between differing legal contexts with regard to limitations law). The Rules Enabling Act limitations
are based upon constitutionality and scope, not substantive legal constructs of the state.
This is where the language "arguably procedural" emerges and controls. Where a Federal
Rule can be classified as procedural in an REA context and yet substantive under an Erie
analysis the REA permits the Rule to prevail even if displacement of state policy occurs.
Id.
28 Olin G. Wellborn III, The FederalRules of Evidence and the Application of State
Law in the FederalCourts, 55 TEX. L. RaV. 371, 401 (1994). The validity of the Federal
Rules is not based upon either the Rules Enabling Act or the Rules Decision Act. Since
the FRE were enacted by Congress, neither of these Acts apply and they are presumptively
valid. Id. Furthermore, Wellborn suggests that the enacted Federal Rules of Evidence are
not legitimately open to attack as modifying "substantive state rights" under the REA. Id.
at 402.
29 See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, supra, note 10, at 947.
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C. The First CircuitDecisions

The trend of the First Circuit, as in the majority of the circuits, has been to
interpret the Hanna doctrine to apply to the FRE as well as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.30 At least two other circuits have uniformly applied the Federal
Rules of Evidence in all diversity actions declaring them procedural, as has the
First Circuit.3 1 Ostensibly, there exists a definite range and scope as to how far
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in any particular jurisdiction.32 While the

United States District Courts within the First Circuit have applied the Hanna
test uniformly, the First Circuit has struggled with its final stance on the issue.
In 1985, the First Circuit dealt with a pure FRE conflict in Mclnnis v.
A.M.F., InC.33 The plaintiff, who received severe injuries in a motorcycle
accident brought suit against the manufacturer. At issue was whether FRE 403
or a similar state-fashioned rule applied to the admissibility of evidence relating
to alcoholic beverage consumption.34
The Commonwealth rule totally
30

See FED. R. EVID., Introduction p. Ill (1993).

The Federal Rules of Evidence

were enacted by the Supreme Court as Rules of Court effective 1973. 56 F.R.D. 183. The
Rules were then enacted into law by Congress on July 1, 1975. 88 Stat. 1926. See
Washington v. Department of Transp., 8 F.3d (5th Cir. 1993); Milam v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1992); Leitman v. McAusland, 934 F.2d 46 (4th
Cir. 1991); Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d 1319 (6th Cir. 1990); Romine v. Parman,
831 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1987); Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1986); Mclnnis
v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985).
31 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits are strongest in their blanket application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to diversity actions. For Fifth Circuit decisions, see Washington v. Department of Transp., 8 F.3d 296,300 (5th Cir. 1993) (declaring Federal Rules of
Evidence "procedural") and Morris v. Homco Intern., Inc., 853 F.2d 337,341 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that "diversity cases in federal court are... governed by federal, not state,
rules of evidence"). In Morris, the Fifth Circuit does not discuss the substance/procedure
problem. Instead, it avoids it entirely by adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence as entirely procedural where there are provisions made for state rules to apply where Congress
intended those rules to apply. Id. In the Seventh Circuit, see In Re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Ill., 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1983) (Federal Rules of Evidence are
procedural in determining admissibility of evidence because they are Rules and also
statutorily created).
32 Compare Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 860 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1992) (applying federal sufficiency standard) and Gibraltar Sav. v. Ldbrinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275 (5th
Cir. 1988) (applying federal sufficiency) with Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378 (8th
Cir. 1991) (applying state sufficiency standard) and Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d
1319 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying state sufficiency standard of state).
33 McInnis v. A.M.F., 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985). The McInnis case, however, is
barely a case of conflict. The court held that the rules were procedural because they
reached almost identical results. Id. at 246.
34 Id. at 245.
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prohibiting the admissibility of alcohol consumption evidence mirrored that of
Rule 403's prevention of admission of prejudicial evidence.35 The Mclnnis
court held that the FRE, analogous to the FRCP, were clearly intended to apply
to diversity actions under Hanna.36 Under the Hanna analysis all that is
required is to determine that the Federal Rule is (1) constitutionally valid and (2)
within the scope of the REA. Applying the Hanna analysis, the Mclnnis court
held for the first time in the First Circuit that the FRE are presumptively valid
and constitutional.37
The Court held that unless the presumption of
constitutionality and scope of the Rule under the REA is rebutted the Federal
Rule should prevail.38

35 Id.
36 See 765 F.2d 240 at 245. ("Congress clearly intended that the Federal Rules of
Evidence would apply to diversity actions."); see also Rioux v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 582
F.Supp. 620 (D.Me. 1984). The Rioux court noted that no Federal Rule of Procedure or
Evidence had ever been struck down as exceeding the power of Congress and that Congress had specifically intended Hanna to apply to a direct Federal Rule conflict. Id at 624
(citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,750 n.9 (1980). The district courts are
uniform in their application of Hanna analysis to Federal Rule conflicts. United States
District Court, District of Maine has correctly reaffirmed that the Hanna test applies to
direct Federal Rule conflict situations exclusive of Erie analysis. See Wardwell v. U.S.,
758 F.Supp. 769,771 (D.Me. 1991) (upholding FRE as constitutionally valid and applicable in diversity actions); French v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 101 F.R.D. 369, (D.Me. 1984)
(asserting Hanna test in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure context where direct conflict
between state and Federal rule); but see Pasternak v. Achorn 680 F.Supp. 447, 448 (D.Me.
1988) (disallowing seat belt use as evidence of negligence under Maine state law in direct
conflict with FRE admissibility standard). The United States District Court, District of
Massachusetts has also reaffirmed that Hanna controls in Federal Rule conflict situations.
Donovan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 849 F.Supp. 86 (D. Mass. 1994) (upholding FRE hearsay rule as procedural and applied over state hearsay exception in diversity action); Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991) (admitting evidence based
upon FRE in diversity actions).
37 Mclnnis at 244 and n.5. The court held that the rules are presumptively constitutional. Id. In footnote 5 the court further holds that the presumption that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are constitutional is stronger based upon the fact that the rules are not
simply reviewed, but are actually edited and written by Congress as well as the Judiciary.
Id.
38 See Carrington, supra, note
27:
Although the "test" addressed the issue of federalism ... many promptly
assumed it meant that the Court had endorsed an unconstrained view of its
powers under the [Rules Decision Act] to make rules of court without
substantive consequences.
The result, claims Carrington, was for the Federal Rules of Evidence to be drafted
and enacted. Id.
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The Mclnnis court found that the state rule was procedural because the
state rule and the Federal Rule both went to the same mechanistic end of
preventing the admission of prejudicial evidence.39 No substantive state policy
governed the admission of the contested evidence.'
The court applied the
Federal Rule because there was no state substantive policy being served, the
federal relevance rule did not promote forum shopping, and both rules had nearly
the same procedural result.4
The First Circuit next addressed the issue of FRE applicability in diversity actions two years later in Ricciardi v. Children'sHospital Medical
Center, Inc.4" The plaintiff brought suit for medical malpractice, arguing
that the doctors and hospital were negligent when an aortic cannula became
disconnected from a patient during an operation.43 The consulting doctor,
who was not present during the incident, allegedly scribbled a hand-written
note about the incident." The note was the basis of the patient's claim. The
consulting doctor, however, did not have personal knowledge of the incident
and also did not recall where he obtained the information.45 The district
court ruled that the note was hearsay and that it did not fit any of the exceptions to the federal hearsay rule providing a business records exemption.'
The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the Massachusetts statute permitting
the admission of hospital records applied and would have permitted the admission of the note.47
39 Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 245. The "Rule of Handy" prohibited the evidence of
the
consumption of alcoholic beverages. Id. The Court argued that the underlying considerations and results were merely procedural monitoring or administration of substantive
rights of the defendant. Id. Under the Handy rule, the evidence would be excluded altogether, whereas Federal Rule would exclude it if it were deemed prejudicial. Id.
40 Id.
41

Id.; but see Rovegno v. Geppert Bros. Inc., 677 F.2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1982) (holding

that Pennsylvania Law with regard to admissibility of blood alcohol content should be
employed). The First Circuit, while aware of the decision of Third Circuit, properly held
that the Third Circuit did not apply the Congressional mandate for Federal Rule preemption via the Hanna doctrine correctly.
42 Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, Inc., 811 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. at 20. An aortic cannula circulates blood from the heart-lung machine back
into the body when the heart is being by-passed for surgery. Id.
44 Id. The note read: "during surg. episode of aortic cannula accidentally
out 40-60
sec." Id.
43

45

Id.

46 Id.
47 Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, Inc., 811 F.2d at 20.
GEN.

L. ch. 233 § 79 (allowing hospital records into evidence).

See MASS.
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The First Circuit held that the exception to the Hearsay rule under the FRE
was nearly identical to that of the state rule in question.4" Both the Federal Rule
and the Massachusetts statute applied to regularly conducted business activity.
The court however, held that neither rule applied because under either test the
source of the information must be known to the person making the record.49
Finding the evidence inadmissible under both the state and Federal Rule, the
court found, as in Mclnnis, that no conflict existed. 0
The Ricciardicourt analyzed the issue as a non-conflict between the federal
business records exception to the Hearsay Rule and the state Statute allowing
admission of hospital records. If there had been a conflict, the court stated in
dicta that it would look to see if there were any substantive policy underpinnings.
The Court strongly suggests that it would apply the state law over the FRE if
any policy could be found.51
The Ricciardi decision anchored the First Circuit's federalist approach of
examining the policy behind a state statute and not solely the statute itself as
prescribed in Hanna. The application of the Ricciardi approach, however, was
not utilized until the First Circuit's 1990 holding in Carota v. Johns Manville
Corp.52

In Carota, defense counsel moved to admit evidence of previous

settlement with co-defendant asbestos companies.53 Carota contended that such
evidence was inadmissible under FRE 408." 4 Celotex, the remaining defendant
and asbestos manufacturer, contended that the state rule should apply because
the policy behind the rule was a damages provision and not an evidentiary
55
provision.
48

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 79. See also Ricciardi, 811

F.2d at 22. The Ricciardicourt held that the statutes were functionally equivalent and the
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) was consistent with the Massachusetts legislation. Id.
49 Id. at 23. See Petrocelli v. Gallison, 679 F.2d 286 (lst Cir. 1982) (holding
impossibility of determining source of record fatal to admissibility of that evidence).
50 Ricciardi, 811 F.2d at 22. The court held: ".... these two rules are very similar
in application. In this case the note is inadmissible under both rules. Therefore even if
we could discern some substantive policy at stake in the state hospital records exception,
there would be no conflict with that policy in applying the federal rule here." Id.
51 See id. at 21 ("the question here, then, is whether application
of the federal business records exception would impinge upon some substantive state policy embodied in the
state rule").
52 893 F.2d 448 (1st. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 449.
See FED. R. EVID. 408 (1993) (prohibiting admissibility of offers of compromise
and compromise agreements).
5 Carota, 893 F.2d at 451. The Carota court agreed with this reasoning.
The court
wrongfully applied the Erie doctrine where the test "falls within the twilight zone between
53

54
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The Massachusetts legislative decision to allow such evidence under the
state rule was to prevent double recovery and therefore the substantive state rule
was incompatible with Rule 408.56 The plaintiff countered with Fifth Circuit
precedent which held that the money already collected would be subtracted from
such an award and be consistent with state policy of jury consideration of
previous award.57 The result would lead to neither conflict nor impingement
upon substantive state law or state policy behind the statute.5 8 The court,
however, was not impressed with the plaintiff's argument and held that the issue
of out-of-court settlements as evidence was inherently linked to jury entitlement
to hear evidence.59 Thus, the court ruled that the application of Rule 408
conflicted with the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.60
While the Carotadecision represents the first real mutation of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federalist concerns, the 1994 decision of Daigle v.
Maine Medical CenterJnc.,61 is a step toward limiting the deference to state
law. Under a grotesque fact scenario, Dawn Daigle brought an action against
Maine Medical Center (MMC) for injuries incurred from complications while
giving birth. 62 Daigle lost on her claim for negligence. On appeal she claimed
that federal evidentiary law should have applied and not the Maine Health Act.63
Daigle claimed that the evidentiary provisions under the Maine Health Act
prevented her from invoking hearsay exceptions and the ability to impeach the
witness' credibility.64 At issue was whether Maine's Health Act was in
substantive conflict with the FRE.65 The First Circuit held that the Health Act's
substance and procedure." Id. This is precisely where the Rules Conflict Model should
take effect. Id.
56 Id.
Carota, 893 F.2d at 451; see also McHann v. Firestone and Rubber Co., 713 F.2d
161, 166 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983) (subtracting previous award from jury verdict is consistent
with state policy of jury consideration of previous award).
58 Carota, 893 F.2d at 451.
57

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Daigle v. Maine Medical Center, Inc., 14 F.3d 684 (1st Cir. 1994).

62

Id. at 686. Daigle was admitted to Maine Medical Center where she underwent

surgery. Id. During preparation, a catheter that was inserted into the jugular vein punctured her carotid artery. Id. The delivery was successful, but the physicians were forced
to intubate her while she was awake. Id.
63 Daigle, 14 F.3d at 689. The Maine Health act provides an alternative dispute
resolution where the parties must undergo pre-litigation screening. Id.
64 Id. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (allowing exceptions to the hearsay rule); FED. R.
EVID. 806 (relating to impeachment of credibility).
65 Daigle, 14 F.3d at 689.
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evidentiary portions were procedural in nature, but could co-exist with the
FRE.66 The Maine Health Act was deemed substantive in nature because it is
the state's attempt to curtail expensive litigation. The Health Act, however, was
independent of the federal
court and therefore each could co-exist without
67
interference or conflict.
In late 1994, the First Circuit attempted to resolve the substance/procedure
dichotomy in Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Industry. In a products
liability action concerning the failure of a pylon in a prosthetic leg, the plaintiff
argued that the FRE did not apply to the proceeding where the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts' evidence law would conflict.68 At issue was whether notice of
subsequent remedial measures could be admitted. 69 A direct conflict existed and
the court held that the FRE controlled. 70 Ignoring precedent subsequent to
Mclnnis, the court held that it had been long established that the FRE were
presumptively
procedural and were to be applied in matters of diversity
7
jurisdiction. '

66

Id. The Court held that, similar to the Supreme Court's determination in Walker,

there was no conflict and that the Health Act and the Federal Rules of Evidence could coexist. Id. Furthermore, since the Health Act's policy is not to conflict with the Federal
Rule, the scope of the rule does not even reach the question of analysis under the Rules
Conflict test. Id.
67 Id.
68

Cameron, 43 F.3d at 15.

Mr. Cameron fell when a pylon in his artificial leg

broke into two pieces. Id. He fell and fractured his pelvis. Id. The plaintiff claimed
damages for the fractured pelvis and mental trauma. Id. His wife claimed damages for
loss of consortium. Id.
69 Id. at 17. The prosthetisists were sent letters by the manufacturer of the prosthesis after Mr. Cameron's fall. The plaintiff argued that these letters should be admitted
into evidence. Id. The court held that these letters were covered by Rule 407 which provides in pertinent part:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EvID 407. The court ruled that the letters from the manufacturer to the prosthetisists were "subsequent remedial measures" which evidence was not admissible and did
not fall into one of the exceptions categories. Id.
70 Cameron, 43 F.3d at 17,18.
71

Id.
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1I. ANALYSIS

The First Circuit has consistently applied the FRE in diversity actions.72
The court, however, has relied upon the absence of conflict when applying the
FRE. Until recently, the holdings and dicta of the First Circuit's decisions
demonstrated a willingness to apply an Erie analysis to what is essentially a
Rule conflict problem. 3 The First Circuit's decision in Cameron, however
deems the FRE procedural, reaffirming the McInnis decision. Therefore, under
either the Federal Rule analysis or the Erie analysis, the FRE will be applied
over the state rules of evidence in First Circuit diversity actions. While the result
of Cameron mandates the application of the FRE, it is important to trace the
uncertain history of the First Circuit's application analysis.
The Mclnnis decision was a pure rule conflict model discussion and
application of Hanna.74 A close reading of the case, however, revealed the First
Circuit's general disfavor of federal intrusion upon state autonomy." While
deferring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Erie and Hanna, the court subtly
reiterates that federal law should not displace substantive policies of the state.76
The reasoning of the court suggests that the First Circuit will not be
formalistically railroaded into displacing a facially procedural state statute
where, from a legal realist perspective, there exist substantive state policies
behind the statute.77 Thereafter, the Mclnnis Court listed examples such as the
collateral source rule, the parole evidence rule, or the Statute of Frauds to prove
Congress' intent that
policy decisions behind otherwise "procedural" state rules
78
should be protected.

72 See Daigle v. Maine Medical Center, Inc., 14 F.3d 684 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying
the FRE based upon non-conflict); Ricciardi v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 811 F.2d
18 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying FRE based upon non-conflict); Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765
F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying FRE based on non-conflict). But see Carota v. Johns
Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying state law based upon policy considerations).
73 See supra notes 27,28 and accompanying text.
But see supra note 39
(demonstrating United States District Courts' adherence to Hanna test).
74 See Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 244-245 (1985) (discussing the proper Hanna analysis
to be used where there is a Federal Rule conflict).
75 Id. at 245.
76 Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 245. According to the First Circuit, Congress did not intend
for Rules to preempt state statutes that in reality "serve substantive state policies." Id.
This is a digression from Hanna where the word "policy" is not even mentioned.
77 Id.

78 Id.
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What is troubling about Mclnnis is the reliance on Erie for its conclusive
determination that the FRE was to apply. 79 While the Mclnnis decision
represents a rule conflict situation, the application of Erie in its analysis of the
problem is irrelevant and demonstrated the Court's reluctance of applying
proper Hannaanalysis."0
Notwithstanding the lack of rule conflict, which is necessary for the Hanna
test to be applied, the First Circuit attempted to expand upon Mclnnis in
8 1 The Ricciardi Court cited directly to the dicta in Mclnnis which
Ricciardi.
states that federal law should not replace substantive state law.82 For the first
time the court appealed to "policy" considerations of conflicting state statutes.83
If it could be shown that an underlying substantive policy issue existed,
84
according to that court, the Federal Rule must defer to the state legal construct.
The Carota court applied the Ricciardi analysis, misinterpreting and
misstating the law. The Carota court held that application of the federal law
which is proper under the Hanna analysis would usurp essential power from the
jury.85 The Carota court opined that Erie analysis was an appropriate method
of determining whether a Federal Rule should be displaced by a state rule. 86 The
court held, while not a "traditional" Erie analysis, the Erie doctrine had "evolved
beyond its traditional confines" and had been "narrowed," mandating that the
Federal Rule be displaced only when the Federal Rule impinged upon a state
policy.87 The problem with the court's analysis is that when there is a conflict
between the FRE and a state rule, the conflict resolution is necessarily governed
by the Hannarule conflict model and not the Erie test. 88 Furthermore, the use of
an underlying state policy standard in determining whether a conflict exists is
79 See 765 F.2d at 246. The court held "... . the Rhode Island rule cannot reasonably

be considered substantive in light of the policies reflected in Erie." Id.
80 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 473 ("[lIt cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule
...[was] created to serve a different purpose altogether.").
81 Ricciardi, 811 F.2d at 21.
82

Id. at 21.

83

Id.

84

Id.
See Carota, 893 F.2d at 451 ("Allowing a deduction of out of court settlements

85

from a verdict, while not informing the jury of the amounts of those settlements, thwarts
the rationales behind the Supreme Judicial Court decisions, and usurps from the court the
power to formulate its own policies and to give force to its own law").
86 Id. at 450.
87 Id.
88

See supra text accompanying note 20 (explaining the dichotomous and mutually

exclusive relationship between Hanna and Erie).
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analogous to the unmodified "outcome determination test": every statute, even
purely procedural statutes, have state policy underpinnings.8 9 The result would
give the court unreasonably expansive discretion which was not prescribed in the
Hanna analysis.
Both the Federal Rule and the state rule in Carota had the same end result:
prevention of "double dipping" in damages determination. 90 The First Circuit
became emboldened by the express language of Ricciardi and expanded upon it
by claiming that there was a substantive state policy being infringed upon and
the state's express power was being usurped.91 The conclusion of the court that
the conflict was in the "twilight zone between substance and procedure" was
correct.92 It is precisely under these circumstances that the Rule conflict model
should apply. The Carota court, however, incorrectly applied an Erie analysis."
In Carota,the First Circuit took a strong position by deferring to the state
law where the state statute was "procedural" under a rule conflict analysis.9"
The reason behind the decision, therefore, could rest only upon federalism ideals
of the First Circuit, as nurtured in dictum of the Mclnnis and Ricciardi
decisions, or more likely, simple confusion about which conflict model to
apply.95 In effect, the Carota decision represented another evolutionary step in
the First Circuit's misapplication of the Hanna doctrine and the promotion of
arguably unnecessary guardianship of state autonomy. 96
The Daigle decision demonstrated the First Circuit's effort to avoid the
application of the Hanna test. The First Circuit after Daigle, could, with almost
surgical precision, pick and choose which state policies or parts of state policies
are in conflict with a Federal Rule.97 The Daigle decision effectively allowed the
First Circuit to sidestep the issue by declaring "no conflict" in avoiding possible
Rule conflicts.

89

See supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (explaining the outcome determination

test in unmodified form).
90 Carota, 893 F.2d at 45 1.
91
92

Id. at 451.
Id.

93 Id.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
95 See, e.g., Sloviter, supra note 6; Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 240; Ricciardi, 811 F.2d at

18.
96

See supra notes 6-9 (discussing the different governmental climate that no longer

requires nor justifies the protection of diversity jurisdiction).
97 Daigle, 14 F.3d at 689.
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In Cameron the first circuit, in its most recent and surprising decision,
reversed its illogical analytical trend holding that it historically has held the FRE
to be procedural in nature and presumptively applicable to diversity actions.9"
The Court cited only to Mclnnis, ignoring the improper and problematic analysis
employed by interim decisions of the First Circuit.99 Before Cameron, the court
had effectively avoided the issue of analyzing the application of the FRE in
diversity actions. By deeming the FRE presumptively procedural, the First
Circuit now mandates their application, making substance/procedure analysis
irrelevant.1 °° The court has apparently attempted to return to the basic Hanna
analysis: that the FRE historically have applied to all diversity actions and that
they are presumptively valid. It is safe to assume, for the moment, that the FRE
will generally apply in all diversity actions after Cameron. What remains to be
seen is if the First Circuit will follow Cameron in the future and apply the
proper Hanna test to conflicts between the FRE and state legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit has generally applied the FRE to diversity actions. The
court's reasoning, however, has not been based upon the analysis announced in
Hanna. Rather, the First Circuit historically side-stepped the issue by claiming
no direct conflict existed. The spurious results antedating Cameron are
conclusions that are based upon factors other than conflict analysis under Hanna
or Erie.
Notwithstanding the controversial analytical nature of the decisions since
Mclnnis, the First Circuit has surprisingly reaffirmed Mclnnis, disregarded its
interim decisions, and correctly set the standard that the FRE presumptively
apply in diversity jurisdiction cases. Cameron cements the notion of the general
applicability of the FRE in the First Circuit by ignoring the post-Mclnnis
decisions. While untested, the Cameron decision offers the practitioner a strong
presumption that the FRE are inherently procedural, under any application test,
and should be applied in cases where federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity
of citizenship.
Daniel C. Hohler

98

Cameron, 43 F.3d at 18.

Id. The court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied because they
"address procedural matters, [were] duly passed by Congress, [and] shall be presumed
constitutionally valid unless they cannot rationally be characterized as rules of procedure."
Cameron, 43 F.3d at 18 (quoting Mcinnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240 at 244).
100 See supra notes 21-30 (describing substance/procedure distinctions under both
99

Erie and Hanna tests).

